

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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NSCE-00 USIE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 NRC-05 ERDE-00 /088 W
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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2278

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0401

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: US/SOVIET BILATERAL OF JULY 14, 1977

1. WITH AGREEMENT OF AD HOC GROUP, US REP AND DEPREP
MET WITH SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV JULY 14
TO GIVE SOVIETS BRIEF DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND
CONSIDERATIONS ON NEW WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL.

2. US REP SAID IT HAD BEEN THE CUSTOM FOR SOVIETS
AND US TO INFORM EACH OTHER ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS
OF SIGNIFICANT MOVES ABOUT TO BE MADE. THEREFORE
HE WISHED TO GIVE A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSAL
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THE WEST WOULD TABLE ON JULY 15.

3. THE PROPOSAL WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN EXCHANGE OF
DATA WHICH WOULD IN PRACTICE GIVE DATA FROM WHICH
NATIONAL TOTALS COULD BE COMPUTED, WITH ONE SMALL
EXCEPTION, A SEPARATE TOTAL FOR WESTERN
PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS.

THE NUMBER INVOLVED WAS ONLY ABOUT 8,000.
THE PROPOSAL ALSO CALLED FOR TABLING DATA ON MAJOR FORMATIONS. THE PROPOSAL WOULD SUGGEST THAT A SIMILAR PROCEDURE BE FOLLOWED FOR BOTH GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES.

4. US REP SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON DATA IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT AT ALL. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT TO REACH SUCH AN AGREEMENT, PARTICIPANTS HAD TO LOCATE THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. TO DO THIS, BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT MORE DETAILED DATA IS NECESSARY. THE DATA THAT WOULD BE EXCHANGED UNDER THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO GET A MUCH BETTER IDEA OF THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. IF THE EAST WERE SINCERELY INTERESTED IN FINDING THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY, AND IN MOVING TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT, THE EAST SHOULD AGREE TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THIS PROPOSAL. TO GET AT THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GO BEYOND NATIONAL TOTALS. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD DO THIS BUT THE WEST HAD CAREFULLY SELECTED ONLY THE LARGEST UNITS.

5. TARASOV SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE TERM "MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS". US REP REPLIED IT WOULD BE HEADQUARTERS SUCH AS SHAPE. TARASOV SAID THIS MEANT
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THIS GROUP WOULD NOT BE DIVIDED ON A NATIONAL BASIS, BUT THAT OTHER FIGURES WOULD BE. US REP SAID THAT THIS WAS CORRECT. TARASOV COMMENTED THAT THE STRUCTURE OF EASTERN FORCES DIFFERED AND THAT NOT ALL COUNTRIES HAD ARMIES. US REP SAID THAT WESTERN PROPOSAL TOOK THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

6. TARASOV SAID THAT EAST CONSIDERED THEIR PROPOSAL ON NATIONAL FIGURES A REASONABLE AND EFFECTIVE WAY TO GET AT THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. WHAT ADVANTAGES WOULD THE NEW PROPOSAL HAVE OVER THIS EASTERN APPROACH? US REP REPLIED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD GO BEYOND NATIONAL TOTALS TO A LIMITED EXTENT AND THAT THIS WOULD HELP IN IDENTIFYING THE DISCREPANCY. THE FRG AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEANS WERE VERY CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT GIVING THE SOVIET UNION POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THEIR FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN GETTING NATIONAL TOTALS AS A BASIS FOR IDENTIFYING THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0401

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

7. IN THIS PROPOSAL, THE WEST HAD GONE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN THE LIGHT OF THESE WEST EUROPEAN CONCERNS. IT WOULD ONLY KEEP OUT ABOUT 8,000 MEN OUT OF A MILLION. THIS WAS NOT REALLY SIGNIFICANT. GIVEN THESE CONCERNS, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS A PRACTICAL WAY TO GET ON WITH THE DATA AND WORK ON MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AT THE SAME TIME AND THUS MAKE PROGRESS IN THE DISCUSSION.

8. TARASOV SAID THE SOVIETS WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN MAKING PROGRESS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION. THE CRITERION THEY WOULD APPLY WAS HOW A GIVEN PROPOSAL WOULD HELP PARTICIPANTS FIND THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. THEY WOULD APPLY THE SAME CRITERION IN STUDYING THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. SHUSTOV SUGGESTED THAT THE
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WEST TABLE ITS PROPOSAL IN WRITING FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY.

US REP SAID THAT POINT SEEMED REASONABLE AND WEST WOULD CONSIDER IT. TARASOV SAID HE THOUGHT THE CONCEPT OF ADVANCE WORD WAS A USEFUL ONE AND THIS INFORMATION WOULD PLACE THE SOVIETS IN A POSITION TO ASK QUESTIONS IN THE FORTH-COMING SESSIONS. US REP ENCOURAGED TARASOV TO PUT QUESTIONS AND SAID WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE ANSWERS.

9. SHUSTOV SAID HE THOUGHT IT IMPROBABLY THAT THERE WOULD BE AN DEFINITIVE EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL UNTIL AFTER THE RECESS.

10. SHUSTOV ASKED WHETHER WEST WOULD PUBLICIZE THIS NEW PROPOSAL. IF SO, THIS MIGHT COMPEL SOVIETS TO TAKE A PUBLIC POSITION AGAINST IT EARLY ON. US REP SAID THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD EXERCISE FULL RESTRAINT ON PUBLIC TREATMENT OF THEIR PROPOSAL. THEY MIGHT POSSIBLY MENTION THAT THEY HAD MADE A NEW DATA PROPOSAL, BUT THEY WOULD DECLINE TO GIVE DETAILS ON GROUNDS OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. COMMENT: WE SUGGEST ADDRESSES FOLLOW A HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE PUBLICITY APPROACH TAKING THEIR LEAD FROM REMARKS BY AD HOC GROUP SPOKESMAN IN END OF ROUND PRESS CONFERENCE TO BE HELD JULY 22, IN ORDER TO AVOID DAMAGE TO CHANCES OF ACCEPTANCE OF WESTERN PROPOSAL. RESOR

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